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ABSTRACT: According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith (2000), “restricted particularism” is not affected by their superven-
ience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly 
that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a cen-
tral role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this ob-
jection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conver-
sations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive similarities and differences being relevant in 
the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a 
presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s (1989). 
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Particularism has generated a great amount of literature during the last years. Part of 
the discussion is about which is exactly the specific content of the particularist’s claim. 
In a recent paper, ‘Ethical Particularism and Patterns,’ Frank Jackson, Phillip Pettit 
and Michael Smith (2000) claim that particularism can be generally conceived as the 
view according to which the evaluative is “shapeless” with respect to the descriptive: 
there is no descriptive pattern unifying the class of items of a given evaluative kind. 
 Particularists so characterized —like almost everyone nowadays— commit them-
selves to a certain global supervenience claim: (roughly) descriptively identical worlds 
are evaluatively identical. Jackson, Pettit & Smith argue that, although this superven-
ience claim is in itself compatible with particularism, considerations that take off from 
it provide an argument against the view. In section 1 I will summarize these considera-
tions: there seems to be no way in which supervenience can be respected without the 
kind of patterned connections between the descriptive and the evaluative that particu-
larists deny. 
 If these considerations are sound —as I’m inclined to think they are— commit-
ment to supervenience (and avoidance of a sui generis character of the evaluative) guar-
antee there should be (in principle knowable) descriptive patterns unifying the in-
stances of evaluative kinds, and hence the rejection of particularism, as characterized. 
Recent debates about the response-dependence of colors or the comic, however, may 
suggest a view according to which those descriptive patterns essentially involve certain 
responses of subjects like us, compatibly with there being no such patterns in the 
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(evaluated) things themselves, as it were. This is what Jackson, Pettit & Smith label “re-
stricted particularism” (2000, p. 93): according to it, there are principles running from and 
to the descriptive and the evaluative, and the evaluative is not shapeless with respect 
to the descriptive —although its shape can only be discerned when one steps back and 
see its effects on us. 
 “Restricted particularism” is thus strictly speaking not a version of particularism, as 
characterized. Why label it ‘restricted particularism’ at all? According to Jackson, Pettit 
& Smith, “restricted particularism is, at the bottom, the view of many who call them-
selves particularists” (2000, p. 93). The extent to which this is so, and whether this 
would indeed vindicate the appropriateness of the label, is something with respect to 
which I do not need to take a stance. In this paper, I want to defend the view they call 
‘restricted particularism’ from the consideration they offer against it. Hence I will stick 
to the cautious quotes in referring to “restricted particularism,” as to avoid any com-
mitments to whether my response, if sound, will be available to or incompatible with 
the main tenets of those who called themselves ‘particularists.’1
 As just alluded to, Jackson, Pettit & Smith think that “restricted particularism”, al-
though immune to their supervenience-based argument against full-blown particular-
ism, suffers from another difficulty, which I will explain in section 3: it “would violate 
the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a cen-
tral role is played by various similarity claims, claims of the form ‘Given you say that 
about this case, the onus is on you to explain why you do not say the same about this 
other similar case,’ where it is often clear that the similarities in question are descrip-
tive ones in the acts themselves as opposed to similarities in the response-dependent role 
they play” (2000, pp. 93-4). 
 My defense of “restricted particularism” will be in the final section 4. I will not 
deny the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversa-
tions concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive similarities and differ-
ences being relevant to moral similarities and differences, in the way described by 
Jackson, Pettit and Smith. But I will argue that acknowledgment of this is compatible 
with restricted particularism, contrary to what they state. Hence, their consideration 
against “restricted particularism” is not sound in general. In order to argue for this, I 
will offer an indirect route which will exploit the pragmatic component that the “re-
stricted particularist” proposal should, in my view, include, concerning the relevant 
(actual and counterfactual) similarities between the speaker and the addressee.  
1. Jackson, Pettit & Smith against Particularism 
Jackson, Pettit & Smith claim that particularism, if it is to be an interesting and distinc-
tive view, can be characterized as the view according to which the evaluative is 
“shapeless” with respect to the descriptive: there is no descriptive pattern unifying the 
class of items of a given evaluative kind. As such it is to be contrasted with more tra-
ditional forms of principle-ism, having it that there is such a unifying descriptive pattern 
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—be this known (as some utilitarians would think), or unknown but knowable in 
principle, if not in practice. 
 As I said at the beginning, Jackson, Pettit & Smith hold that particularism so con-
ceived can be put into tension with the global supervenience claim that particularists 
aim to respect: (roughly) descriptively identical worlds are evaluatively identical. Their 
argument can be summarized as follows. If the global supervenience claim is true then 
the way a world is evaluatively cannot vary independently of the way a world is de-
scriptively: a complete specification of the way a world is descriptively would fix a 
complete specification of the way a world is evaluatively. In particular, a complete 
specification of the way a world is descriptively would fix whether a given particular X 
is, say, right. Therefore the global supervenience claim entails that there are necessary 
conditionals of the form (where each Di stands for a complete specification of the way 
a world is descriptively) 
If D1 then X is right 
If D2 then X is right 
… 
Now is there any pattern that unifies all the Di’s such that ‘if Di then X is right’ is true? 
The global supervenience claim, by itself, does not require that there be: in so far as 
supervenience is concerned, the grouping of the relevant Di’s may be entirely random. 
So there seems to be four alternatives: either (i) there is no pattern; or (ii) there is a 
pattern, but is uncodifiable; or (ii) there is a pattern, but is descriptively uncodifiable; 
or (iv) there is a descriptively codifiable pattern. Principle-ism certainly holds (iv). But 
according to Jackson, Pettit and Smith each of (i), (ii) and (iii) have consequences that 
put particularism in big trouble. (i) faces the following “semantic” difficulty: it makes 
hard to account for the possibility of grasping ‘is right.’ In their words: 
We use words to mark divisions. Tables are different from chairs, and we mark this by using differ-
ent words for them. In the same way, wrong acts are different form right ones… What, then, marks 
off the acts we use ‘right’ for from the acts we use ‘wrong’ for? Or, equivalently, what do the right 
ones have in common that the wrong ones lack? … Grasp of the predicate ‘is right’ simply consists 
in a grasp of the various Di which constitute that set. But this cannot be all that unites the class of 
right actions. There must be some commonality in the sense of a pattern that allows projection from 
some sufficiently large subset of the Di to new members. If there isn’t, we finite creatures could not 
have grasped through a finite learning process (the only sort there is) the predicate ‘is right.’ So there 
must be a pattern of commonality —in the weak sense operative in this paper of that which enables 
projection— uniting the sent of right acts. (2000, pp. 86-7) 
If this is sound, it will certainly apply to (ii) as well: 
But unknowable patterns present similar problems to non-existent ones. We noted earlier that if 
the connection between the descriptive ways things are and the moral ways thins are is a random 
one, the it is impossible to see how we could have come to grasp moral concepts by exposure to, 
or reflection on, a finite number of cases. The same is true if, as far as we can tell, the connection is 
a random one. (2000, p. 89, emphasis in the original) 
To the extent the particularist holds the global supervenience claim, it seems, she will 
have to be committed to (iii). But according to Jackson, Pettit and Smith, then the 
problem is then the following: 
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If this is the particularists’ view, however, then we think that they can fairly be accused of false 
advertising. Under examination the new and exciting thesis that there are no moral principles col-
lapses into the jejune doctrine advanced by Moore at the turn of the century: moral properties are 
sui generis, and hence not to be found among the descriptive. (2000, p. 88) 
I am inclined to think this argument is sound, and hence to endorse the conclusion: 
commitment to supervenience and avoidance of a sui generis character of the evaluative 
guarantee that there should be (in principle knowable) descriptive patterns unifying 
evaluative kinds, and hence, given that I grant the assumptions, to reject particularism 
as characterized. It is important to notice that even if that turns out not to be 
grounded, this would not affect the purposes of this paper. 
2. “Restricted Particularism” 
After having completed the argument I have summarized in the previous section, 
Jackson, Pettit & Smith observe that consideration to the recent debate about colors 
or the comic may suggest a specific view on behalf, perhaps, if not of the letter of the 
particularist claim, maybe at least part of the spirit: the view according to which those 
descriptive patterns essentially involve certain responses of subjects like us, compati-
bly with there being not such patterns in the (evaluated) things themselves, as it were. As I 
said in the introduction, this is what Jackson, Pettit & Smith label ‘restricted particular-
ism’: 
We might call the view that there is no descriptive pattern in the right actions themselves restricted 
particularism. It holds that all that unifies the right (and, for that matter, the good, the bad, and 
so on) lies in something about our responses. This can be given descriptively, and so, in one per-
fectly good sense, there are principles, so called, running to and from the descriptive and the 
moral, and the moral is not shapeless with respect to the descriptive. However, on this view, its 
shape can only be discerned when you step back and see its effects on us. Obviously, restricted 
particularism is a substantial retreat on what some particularists want to say —the moral is 
shaped, albeit its shape comes from our responses— but we hazard, all the same, that restricted 
particularism is, at bottom, the view of many who call themselves particularists. (2000, pp. 92-3) 
The best way I know of elaborating on the content of “restricted particularism” is by 
reference to recent debates on response-dependence, to which Jackson, Pettit, & 
Smith also refer. The notion of response-dependence was introduced by Mark Johns-
ton (1989) trying to generalize the notion of a secondary quality, by applying also to 
values in a way that —at least a qualified form of— evaluative realism was vindicated. 
His original characterization of it could be stated as follows. Let me say then that if F 
is a (predicative) concept, a response-dependence-giving biconditional for F (rd biconditional, for 
short) is a substantial biconditional of the form: 
x is F iff x has the disposition to produce in subjects S the mental response R 
under conditions C 
or the form 
x is F iff subjects S have the disposition to issue the x-directed mental re-
sponse R under conditions C 
where ‘is F ’ is a predicate expressing F, and ‘substantial’ is there to avoid “whatever-
it-takes” specifications of either S, R or C. (One such “whatever-it-takes” specification 
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of, say, subjects S would be “those subjects, however they be, such that something is 
disposed to produce in them responses R under conditions C iff it is F.” Mutatis mu-
tandis for the responses and the conditions.) Johnston’s proposal was then that a 
(predicative) concept is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence-giving 
biconditional for it which holds a priori. 
 Several philosophers2 have recently provided arguments that in my view compel-
lingly show that the original characterization of response-dependent concepts by 
Johnston just considered does not succeed with respect to his original, metaphysical, 
project, i.e. of appropriately generalizing the notion of a secondary quality. The main 
element can be put straightforwardly: there are also rd biconditionals for concepts for 
—what we reasonably take to be— primary qualities which hold a priori. Or more gen-
erally, there are concepts that are response-dependent, in this sense, independently of 
whether they signify primary, fully objective, properties. Therefore, at least insofar as 
the original project for which response-dependence was introduced is to be pursued, 
the characterization of the notion should be modified. The one I favor, elaborated by 
García-Carpintero (2007) and Wedgwood (1998), dwells upon the ideas of Kit Fine 
concerning the notion of essence. A property P is response-dependent iff there is an rd 
biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of P. 
 But now a crucial distinction need be drawn, in terms of whether rigid specifica-
tions of the subjects are allowed in the relevant rd biconditionals. Let me begin by say-
ing that a specification of the subjects in an rd biconditional is rigid iff the relevant 
predicate involved in the specification is rigid.3 So take for instance ‘human who fails 
no discrimination test passed by other human subjects.’ This is not, as it stands, a rigid 
specification. For take the relevant predicate ‘is a human who fails no discrimination 
test passed by other human subjects’ and suppose that in the actual world, it is true 
(even if knowable only a posteriori) that being a human who fails no discrimination test 
passed by other human subjects is being a human with a perceptual apparatus meeting 
condition ABC. Now consider a counterfactual situation in which, due to whatever 
reason you might think of, humans who fail no discrimination test passed by other 
human subjects are those with a perceptual apparatus meeting condition DEF. Now 
intuitively, it is this other property of being a human with a perceptual apparatus meet-
ing condition DEF which would be relevant for evaluating sentences containing ‘is a 
human who fails no discrimination test passed by other human subjects’ with respect 
to this other world. But then ‘is a human who fails no discrimination test passed by 
other human subjects’ is not a rigid predicate. Its relevant rigidification, which can be 
                                                     
2 Including Manuel García-Carpintero (2007), Jussi Haukioja (2000), Frank Jackson (1998, Jackson & 
Pettit 2002), Philip Pettit (1998, Jackson & Pettit 2002), and Ralph Wedgwood (1998). 
3 I am assuming, with Kripke, and a lot of people in discussions on philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
science or metaethics, that the notion of rigidity might be extended to be applicable to predicates, 
roughly along the lines of: a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property in all relevant worlds. 
Proposals like this have recently received criticisms, among which: that it assumes that signification 
can hold between predicates and properties, that it would overgeneralize, making all predicates trivi-
ally rigid, and that in any case it would count as rigid predicates some that do not signify natural 
properties/kinds. I try to respond to these criticisms in López de Sa 2008a and López de Sa forth-
coming. 
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put as something like ‘is actually a human who fail no discrimination test passed by 
other human subjects’ leads nonetheless to a rigid specification of the subjects, of the 
sort of ‘humans who fail no discrimination test passed by other human subjects, as 
they actually are.’ Let me say that a rd biconditional is rigid iff it involves a rigid speci-
fication of the subjects, and that it is flexible otherwise. Now, and this is the distinction, 
given a response-dependent property, it is a rigid response-dependent property iff the 
rd biconditionals for concepts signifying it which hold in virtue of its nature are rigid; 
and it is a flexible response-dependent property iff there is a rd biconditional for a con-
cept signifying it, holding in virtue of its nature, which is flexible.  
 Rigid response-dependent properties are just dispositions to raise certain responses 
in certain (rigidly specified) subjects under certain conditions, and as such they argua-
bly supervene (locally) on the intrinsic nature of their instantiations. A posteriori con-
siderations seem to support the view that colors are response-dependent properties in 
this rigid sense. By contrast, flexible response-dependent properties have, so to say, 
flexible essences which track the relevant responses whatever the subjects are like, and 
hence, there arguably be nothing in their various actual and counterfactual instantia-
tions that unifies them besides the fact that they are suitably related to the subjects, 
whatever they are like in the various situations. I will understand that “restricted par-
ticularism” amounts to the claim that evaluative properties are flexible response-
dependent properties.4
 One such proposal, useful for the sake of illustration, but which will also play a 
substantive role in my defense of “restricted particularism,” is that of David Lewis in 
his ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’ (1989). The view is that the following holds apri-
ori and in virtue of the essence of being good: 
(L) x is good iff we are disposed to value x under appropriately reflective 
conditions; 
where valuing is the favorable attitude of desiring to desire, and ‘we’ refers to a popula-
tion consisting of the speaker and those relevantly like him, and to be relevantly like a 
given subject is to be disposed, with respect to valuing the relevant thing in question in the 
relevant conditions, exactly how the subject is. It is important to stress that, so under-
stood, ‘we’ turns out to be a flexible characterization of a group of subjects. It ‘is rele-
vantly like me’ actually picks out the property of being relevantly the way I am actually. 
But I could be otherwise, and in particular my disposition to value could be very dif-
ferent from what it actually is. But then, with respect to those worlds in which I am 
suitably different, ‘is relevantly like me’ will signify the property of being relevantly the 
way I would be in those situations. Given this, the proposal is one according to which 
evaluative properties are flexible response-dependent properties, and hence a version of 
“restricted particularism.” 
                                                     
4 In my view, a qualified realism is indeed vindicated with respect to rigid response-dependent properties, 
but not with respect to flexible response-dependent properties —hence response-dependence in the 
unqualified sense ultimately fails with respect to the project for which it was introduced. Concerning 
this, and for elaboration on the content of the preceding paragraphs, see López de Sa 2003 and 
López de Sa MS. 
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 (What is this view true? I do strongly believe that it is —once the pragmatic ele-
ment to be considered below. But that belief of mine will play no role in this paper.) 
3. Jackson, Pettit & Smith against “Restricted Particularism” 
Jackson, Pettit & Smith acknowledge that “restricted particularism” is not affected by 
their considerations against particularism summarized in section 1. According to them, 
though, it suffers for another difficulty: 
[“Restricted particularism”] would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating 
controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims, claims of the form 
‘Given you say that about this case, the onus is on you to explain why you do not say the same 
about this other similar case,’ where it is often clear that the similarities in question are descriptive 
ones in the acts themselves as opposed to similarities in the response-dependent role they play. (2000, 
pp. 93-4) 
And that is so for, as emphasized above, “restricted particularism” is, by characteriza-
tion, compatible with there being no descriptive pattern unifying the instances of a 
given evaluative kind besides that essentially involving the relevant responses of (flexi-
ble specified) subjects. 
 As I said in the introduction, I will not deny the platitudinous character of the 
claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are com-
mitted to descriptive similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by 
Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. That will be, in my 
view, a desperate and unmotivated move. Rather, I will claim, via an indirect route, 
that acknowledgment of this is, contrary to what they state, compatible with “re-
stricted particularism,” and hence that their general argument is not sound. In particu-
lar I will argue that the particular “restricted particularist” proposal of Lewis, sketched 
in section 2, can indeed account for such a platitude, once a pragmatic component of 
the proposal is made explicit, which is independently motivated by a different, even if 
related, worry concerning relativism that some have urged against proposals of this 
sort.  
4. The Pragmatics of Conversations Concerning the Evaluative 
Given that our dispositions to value something are (in each particular case) contin-
gent, the Lewisian proposal seems to entail at least a certain form of relativism con-
cerning the evaluative, arguably a form of “indexical relativism.”5 But relativism of this 
sort, it is often said, contradicts a still more basic platitude regarding conversations 
concerning the evaluative: ordinary participants are committed to regard utterances of 
‘that is good’ and ‘that is not good’ as (literally) contradicting each other. Here is 
Wright’s: 
                                                     
5 Some may have doubts about these relativistic consequences being consistent with the views of many 
who called themselves ‘particularists.’ As I said in the introduction, I am using scare quotes when re-
ferring to “restricted particularism” as a way of discussing the position I am interested in independ-
ently of the views of many who called themselves ‘particularists.’ 
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If [Indexical Relativism] were right, there would be an analogy between disputes of inclinations 
and the ‘dispute’ between one who says ‘I am tired’ and her companion who replies, ‘Well, I am 
not’ (when what is at issue is one more museum visit). There are the materials here, perhaps, for a 
(further) disagreement but no disagreement has yet been expressed. But ordinary understanding 
already hears a disagreement between one who asserts that hurt-free infidelity is acceptable and 
one who asserts that it is not. (Wright 2001, p. 51) 
Again, I don’t want to deny there is disagreement when people ordinarily engage in 
discussions about evaluative issues. That is to say, I will take the following for granted: 
(•) In any ordinary non-defective conversation it is common knowledge 
among the participants that utterances of (say) ‘that is good’ and ‘that is 
not good’ would contradict each other. 
What I would like to resist is the idea that the Lewisian proposal, with the relativism 
concerning the evaluative it entails, is incompatible with (•). 
 Remember that the Lewisian account of values had it that the following holds (a 
priori and) in virtue of the nature of being good: 
(L) x is good iff we are disposed to value x under appropriately reflective 
conditions. 
That entails the following, truth-conditional, component: 
(TC) Utterances of ‘is good’ in ordinary non-defective contexts contribute to 
the truth-condition of simple sentence-token in which they occur (with 
respect to a world) the property of being such that people relevantly like 
the speaker of the utterance (whatever she is like) are disposed to value it 
under appropriate reflective conditions. 
What I propose now is make explicit a second element of the proposal, concerning 
not the truth conditional import of utterances of ‘is good’ but rather the presupposi-
tion it triggers, which I propose to state thus: 
(P) ‘is good’ triggers the presupposition that the addressees are relevantly 
like the speaker both in actual and counterfactual situations. 
(P) is indeed the element that in my view makes the theory clearly not objectionable 
on the bases of disagreement in that, in attention to it, it can be defended that it does 
not violate the main tenets of (•). But before going on to that, let me briefly recall 
some basic facts concerning the presuppositions I’ll be presupposing below. 
 A participant of a conversation presupposes something if he takes it to be part of the 
common ground of the participants, that he is disposed to act, for the sake of the 
conversation, as if he believed it be true. The presuppositions of all participants of a 
given conversation determine the context of the conversation. A non-defective context oc-
curs when all participants are indeed actually presupposing the same, and can be seen 
as the set of worlds in which the relevant presuppositions are indeed true. A context 
presupposes a proposition just if it entails it. Hence, a non-defective context is one 
that presupposes all and only the propositions its participants presuppose. And finally 
a given expression triggers a certain presupposition just if an utterance of it would be in-
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felicitous in the context of a conversation if that context did not presuppose it (or par-
ticipants accommodate it by coming to presuppose it on the basis of the fact that the ut-
terance has been produced). (See Stalnaker 1978) It is in this sense that the second 
presuppositional element (P) concerning ‘is good’ is to be understood. 
 David Lewis does indeed anticipate the kind of move in defending relativism from 
the argument from disagreement I am offering here: 
If some relative version were the correct analysis, wouldn’t that be manifest whenever people talk 
about value? Wouldn’t you hear them saying ‘value for me and my mates’ or ‘value for the likes 
of you’? Wouldn’t you think they’d stop arguing after one speaker say X is a value and the other 
say it isn’t? —Not necessarily. They might always presuppose, with more or less confidence (well-
founded or otherwise), that whatever relativity there is won’t matter in this conversation. (Lewis 
1989, p. 84) 
That is indeed the heart of the reason why attention to (P) shows how the proposal 
does not indeed contradict (•) and is not objectionable in the way the argument from 
disagreement against relativist presumes. Take any ordinary non-defective context, and 
suppose participants in the conversation come to dispute whether a certain particular 
action is good in a given situation, and consider a particular utterance by one of them 
of ‘this action is good.’ According to the proposal, that utterance has as its truth con-
dition the state of affairs which consists in this action being such that a population in-
cluding the speaker is disposed to value it under the relevant conditions, as (TC) re-
quires, and presupposes that the participants in the conversation all belong to that 
population, as (P) has it. As the context is non-defective, all participants presuppose 
that, and hence, are disposed to behave for the sake of the current conversation taking 
it for granted. So if another rejects the considered assertion by uttering ‘no, I don’t 
think it is’ the proposal has it that all participants are committed to view this second 
utterance as having as its truth-condition the failing to obtain of one and the same 
former state of affairs, namely, that in which this action is such that a population which 
includes all participants of the conversation has a certain feature concerning it. In short, 
all participants are committed to see both utterances as contradicting each other, as 
our former principle (•) established. 
 If that is so then the Lewisian account concerning values, when it is understood as 
containing the presuppositional component, can indeed accommodate the fact about 
disagreement contained in (•). But therefore the argument from disagreement against 
relativism in a given domain I have been considering is not successful.6
 But now, coming back to Jackson, Pettit & Smith’s argument against “restricted 
particularism,” I think attention to (P) also shows why a “restricted particularist” pro-
posal like the Lewisian one can indeed accommodate the platitude concerning the 
relevance of descriptive similarities and differences in the things themselves in evalua-
tive conversations. And the reason concerns the previous considered one: any non-
defective conversation will be such as to their participants being relevantly alike. But 
therefore it follows that descriptive similarities and differences in the things themselves 
will be, in that conversation, certainly relevant for the evaluative similarities and differ-
                                                     
6 For further elaboration and discussion, see López de Sa 2003 and 2008b. 
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ences at discussion: provided that a certain commonality among the valuers can be 
granted, quite stronger local dependencies are, in the relevant contexts, secured. 
 Finally, one could object that the content of the platitude was intended to be much 
richer than I have considered, and crucially not be restricted to what goes on in non-
defective conversations. As I have argued elsewhere concerning the corresponding 
objection for the platitude in the case of disagreement,7 however, I do not think that 
the platitudinous character is compatible with the unrestricted content. The unrestricted 
content —that whenever two subjects diverge in their judgments regarding (say) ‘this is 
good,’ whatever worlds they inhabit and however dissimilar they are in their dispositions 
to value, they will regard similarity in response-independent descriptive features as 
relevant for similarity in evaluative features— cannot be motivated just by appealing 
to our intuitions as revealed in our common conversations on the matter. And in my 
view something like this is what would be required in order for it to qualify as a plati-
tude about discussions concerning evaluative issues. Of course, even if not a platitude, 
it could turn out to be true all the same. In one was in a position to argue that this is 
so, that would indeed perhaps contain the materials for an argument against “re-
stricted particularism.” But a different one —and of quite a different nature— from 
the one by Jackson, Pettit & Smith that I have discussed. (And, for what it is worth, I 
think one may be reasonably skeptical about any such argument being, anyway, forth-
coming.) 
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